This paper provides direct evidence that comparisons exert a significant effect on subjective well-being. It also evaluates the relative importance of different types of benchmarks. Internal comparisons to one's own past living standard outweigh any other comparison benchmarks.
A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
Introduction
Is income utility relative, and if so relative to what and how important are the welfare effects of comparisons? The "discrepancy" of "relative utility" theory is quite influential among economists and psychologists (e.g. Michalos, 1985) . The general idea is that individuals compare themselves to a series of standards. Satisfaction judgements then depend on the gap between their actual situation and their comparison benchmarks. The most important implication of relative utility is that increasing the income of all does not increase the happiness of all (Easterlin, 1974 (Easterlin, , 1995 (Easterlin, , 2001 , which questions the relevance of National Income as an objective of economic policy.
An important share of the happiness literature is dedicated to the identification of thresholds in the welfare function of income (or consumption). Essentially, comparators can be of two types: (i) "external benchmarks", i.e. relevant others, such as former schoolmates, colleagues, neighbors, parents, and (ii) "internal norms" or "internal benchmarks", which involve aspirations and dynamic comparisons with one's own income in different points of time.
Hedonic treadmill, habituation and adaptation are the consequences of the second type of comparisons. Of course internal norms are certainly influenced by external benchmarks so that the distinction is not clear-cut. Some authors have also argued that individuals' wellbeing depends essentially on their ordinal ranks within a group rather than on relative income (Brown et al., 2008) .
In spite of the popularity of the concept of relative income in social science, there is not much direct evidence to date about those whom people really compare themselves to. Most of the time, the evidence about comparisons is indirect. In the bulk of the corpus, which is based on survey data, researchers usually have to decide for themselves how to delimit the reference groups, and then verify that the "reference income" that they have constructed does have some statistical influence on the variable of interest. This is because surveys usually contain no direct questions about the composition of reference groups.
Following this general method, some papers have hypothesized that comparisons are made with respect to neighbors. In essence, the authors define the reference group as the inhabitants M a n u s c r i p t 3 of the geographical area where the respondent lives. They calculate the typical income inside this group and include this calculated variable in the regression of happiness, together with the individual income of the respondent. The scope of the geographical reference varies, from being as large as East and West Germany (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005) or American States (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004) , to smaller areas such as the primary census units of the American National Survey of Families and Households (Luttmer, 2005) or the census tract of the Canadian General Social Survey (Helliwell and Huang, 2005) .
Certain authors defined reference groups as being composed of people with whom one has daily interactions, such as family members and friends (MacBride, 2001) . Others elicit colleagues or people exerting the same profession as being the relevant others, in particular concerning job satisfaction (Cappelli and Sherer, 1988 , Clark and Oswald, 1996 , Brown et al., 2008 , Senik, 2004 . The demonstrandum of these articles is precisely to show that the reference group that they have picked up is relevant and that its average income does exert a significant (negative or positive) effect on satisfaction.
Of course, the identification of "internal benchmarks" is an easier task. Basically, researchers model the dependence of current satisfaction over lagged periods of income. The question is then whether, because of adaptation effects and rising aspirations, past levels of income or consumption exert a negative influence on current satisfaction. The Leyden school has made an inaugural contribution in this field by illustrating the existence of a "preference drift" in income satisfaction (see van Praag, 1971 or van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004) . They estimate that about 60% of the satisfaction associated with a rise in a person's income evaporates due to a change in her aspirations. More classical studies of life satisfaction based on panel household surveys mostly confirm the presence of adaptation effects. Moreover, they stress the importance of contrast effects, i.e. of variation in income rather than level of income, as suggested by the prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) . Studies in income adaptation and aspirations include Clark (1999) , Clark, Diener, Georgellis and Lucas (2008), Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald. (2003) and Stutzer (2004) .
However, the type of evidence provided by these studies remains indirect: the benchmark is chosen by the researcher and injected in the satisfaction regression; the assumption that the variable is capturing a comparison benchmark remains an interpretation. Two exceptions are Melenberg (1992) and Knight and Song (2006) . Melenberg used two waves of the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel data in which individuals were asked about "the people whom they A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 4 meet frequently". Following the method of the Leyden school based on the "Minimum Income Question", he showed that the aspirations of individuals are increasing in  the average income of their social network. Knight and Song used a survey of Chinese households and showed that when asked explicitly to whom they compare themselves, 68% of survey respondents report that their main comparison group consists of individuals in their own village. In summary, displaying some direct evidence about the composition of people's reference groups largely remains a challenge that lies ahead of the blooming literature dedicated to comparisons and adaptation. This paper is one of the first studies that try not only to provide direct evidence of comparisons, but also to assess the relative impact of various types of comparisons, including subjective ranking on a social ladder. It also analyzes the relation between income comparisons and the ensuing demand for redistribution. The literature dedicated to this issue has put in evidence the role of self-centered motives such as being a potential recipient of transfers (Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2001), risk-aversion (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000) and expected mobility based on past experienced mobility (Benabou and Ok, 2001; Alesina and la Ferrara, 2005) ; the data offers the opportunity to verify whether relative deprivation and relative performance also exerts an impact on individuals' attitudes towards income redistribution.
This paper relies on the Life in Transition Survey (LITS), a cross-section representative survey of households of all countries of the former socialist bloc. Starting in 1990, Transition countries have been undergoing a process of deep restructuring, leading to the transformation from an administered economy to a market economy, and in many cases from an authoritarian regime to a democracy. The Life in Transition Survey is an investigation into the perception of this transformation by the inhabitants of these countries. An important number of questions explicitly ask people to compare their economic and political situation in 2006 with respect to the pre-Transition period (i.e. before 1989). More specifically, respondents are asked to compare their current living standard with the pre-transition period, or with that of their parents, of their former colleagues, and of their former schoolmates. Two other questions ask respondents to place themselves on a subjective economic ladder reflecting their current situation in 2006 and their past situation back in 1989.
I use this survey in order to evaluate the relevance and the relative importance of the different comparison benchmarks suggested by the aforementioned questions. I start from the idea that A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 5 there is no a priori reason why some people should estimate that they have done better than their colleagues but worse than their former high school mates, or better then their parents but worse than in 1989. Looking at the effect of such opposite evolutions in different dimensions thus helps to avoid the risk of collinearity of comparison benchmarks due to omitted variables. I thus map the different modalities of each pair of variables, creating a series of interaction terms that constitute a total partition of the sample. I estimate Life Satisfaction on these interaction categories, controlling for the usual socio-demographic variables and for country dummies. Finally, I also look at the impact of comparisons on the demand for income redistribution.
The results show that comparisons are relevant and exert a significant impact on subjective well-being. Comparisons are asymmetric: under-performing one's benchmark is always more important than out-performing it. A clear ranking also emerges among the type of interactions that are being analyzed: "intra-personal" comparisons are more important than inter-personal ones. Local comparisons (to parents, former colleagues or high school mates) are more powerful than general ranking in the social ladder and its evolution. Comparisons that affect subjective well-being trigger a "compensating" demand for redistribution, but the relative importance of comparison benchmarks is different, as self-ranking on a general affluence scale is the most important determinant of the demand for redistribution.
The next section presents the LITS survey. Section 3 presents the method, section 4 the results and the last section concludes.
Data
The study hinges on the Life in Transition Survey (see EBRD, 2007) , a survey conducted by the EBRD in 2006, in 28 post-Transition countries (plus Turkey). Respondents to the survey were drawn randomly, using a two stage sampling method, with census enumeration areas as primary sampling units, and households as secondary sampling units. The survey includes 1000 observations per country, for a total of 29002 observations. The sample is equally balanced in terms of gender, but is biased in favor of elder people, with a means of 50 years for respondents A and 46 years old for respondent B (see lower).
The main attitudinal questions that are exploited in this paper are labeled in the following way: M a n u s c r i p t 6 "To what extend do you agree with the following statements:
-I have done better in life than most of my high school mates.
-I have done better in life than most of my colleagues I had around 1989.
-I have done better in life than my parents.
-My household lives better nowadays than around 1989.
-All things considered, I am satisfied with my life now (henceforth Life satisfaction).
-The gap between the rich and the poor today in this country should be reduced .
For each separate question, respondents had to tick one answer out of seven proposed modalities: "strongly disagree/disagree/neither disagree nor agree/agree/strongly agree/not applicable/don't know".
Two other comparison questions were asked:
-"Please imagine a ten-step ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest people, and on the highest step, the tenth, stand the rich. On which step of the ten is your household today?"
-"Now imagine the same ten-step ladder around 1989, on which step was your household at that time?"
As the main questions of interest concern comparisons between 2006 and 1989, I restricted the sample to respondents aged over 40 years old, who were thus born before 1965 and were at least 24 years old in 1989, at the very start of the reform period; this implies an loss of 12020 observations (out of 29002).
Regrettably (in my view) the survey asks a first series of general questions concerning the household to a first respondent (respondent A), including the two "subjective ranking" questions above, and then asks all the other questions to the "last birthday person" in the household (respondent B). In many cases, it fortunately turned out that the same person actually answered all the questions, so that respondent A = respondent B. When it is not the case, it would be questionable to treat the answers of respondent A and respondent B as being associated with the same observation. Of course, this concerns only the two "subjective A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 7 ranking" questions above-mentioned, which are relative to the standard of living of the household and not to the individual himself. This may attenuate the problem, conditional on the fact that the household is still the same in 2006 as it was in 1989. However, to be safe, I take a conservative approach, which consists in keeping only the observations if respondent A and respondent B are the same person. This involves an additional loss of 4796 observations. Eventually, the regressions are run on sample of 11876 observations for 28 countries, leaving aside Turkey. This restriction does not involve noticeable change in the composition of the sample; the average age of the respondent is slightly higher (58.6 instead of 57.8) and the proportion of men higher (50% instead of 46%) in the final sample, but the mean household income is about the same. The descriptive statistics presented in the Appendix are based on the restricted sample.
In the (restricted) sample, the average level of life satisfaction was 2.93 (on a 5 steps ladder).
Mean subjective ranking was 3.94 in 2006 against 5.57 in 1989 (on a 10 steps ladder) . Only 27% of respondents judged that they lived better than in 1989, against 52% who estimated that they lived worse; 28% estimated that they had done better than their former high school mates, 26% than their former colleagues and 52% better than their parents. Only 16% of the respondents placed themselves above the fifth step of the social ladder in 2006. Finally, 85% of the retained sample agreed or strongly agreed that the gap between the rich and the poor should be reduced. This proportion was surprisingly similar across the different income groups 1 . Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) observed the same phenomenon in Russia and related it to the feeling of uncertainty in Transition societies. 1 In LITS, the standard of living is measured using a series of questions regarding household expenditure during the past 12 months on an exhaustive list of items including: food, beverages and tobacco, clothing and footwear, transport and communication, recreation and entertainment, education including tuition, books, kindergarten expenses), health (including health insurance), furnishings (sheets, towels, blankets, linen, etc.), household durable goods (e.g. furniture, household appliances, TV, car, etc.) and other items. All expenditures were converted into a single currency (USD). I distinguished three groups of equal size, M a n u s c r i p t 8
Method
The objective of the paper is to draw some causality from income comparisons to selfdeclared life satisfaction, as well as demand for redistribution. The formulation of comparison questions in the survey allows avoiding two important caveats in the interpretation of subjective comparisons. The first obstacle is the possible endogenous definition of reference groups. An important strand of the psychological literature has shown that reference groups can be chosen instrumentally as a motivation device (self-improvement) or a self-validation strategy (selfenhancement) (see Diener and Lucas, 1999; Falk and Knell, 2004; Diener and Fujita, 1995) .
Some studies suggest that optimistic people only compare downward, whereas pessimistic people compare with more successful ones (Lyubomirski and Ross, 1997). The LITS partly addresses this issue by setting exogenously a list of proposed comparison benchmarks. Of course, the issue of memory bias remains in the sense that respondents can instrumentally "choose" to remember such or such former colleagues. But this is unavoidable as it is important to leave some discretion to respondents in order to be sure that they are comparing with groups of persons that are actually relevant to them.
The second obstacle is that comparisons certainly exert a different impact depending on the person's initial economic background and trajectory. This is again due to the endogeneity of individual aspirations, against which one gauges his economic success. To take this into account, most comparison questions include a dynamic component as the surveyed persons are asked to compare their current economic "success" with that of past references, either their own situation around 1989, their parents, or the current situation of colleagues and schoolmates that they had before 1989. All these comparison benchmarks, except the representing the richest, average and poorest third of the sample in term of real household consumption. M a n u s c r i p t 9 respondent's parents, are made of persons who occupied a similar position as the respondent's around 1989. The comparison questions thus refer to a notion of race, with runners starting from the same place in 1989 and reaching more or less advanced positions in 2006. Even the subjective ladder question can be made dynamic by taking the difference between selfranking in 2006 and self-ranking in 1989.
The third and foremost obstacle to identifying causal relations between comparisons and life satisfaction is omitted variables and reverse causation. Those who estimate that they have done better in life than their former colleagues may just be "happier" persons: they may have a higher satisfaction baseline or circumstances that cause both happiness and success. Here, I draw on the multiplicity of comparison questions. I partition the sample into categories of people who have experienced different evolutions in different dimensions. The rationale is that a priori there is no general reason why some people should estimate that they have done better than their colleagues but worse than their former high school mates, or better then their parents but worse than in 1989. No obvious omitted variable or reverse causation is available for these concomitant opposite variations.
More precisely, concerning the comparison questions, I group the possible answers in three groups: positive, negative and neutral (dropping the not applicable and don't know modalities). Hence, for My household lives better nowadays than around 1989, I create three mutually exclusive dummy variables: livup, a dummy variable which takes value 1 for the modalities agree and strongly agree and 0 otherwise, livdown (a dummy which takes values 1 for the modalities disagree and strongly disagree and 0 otherwise) and livstab (a dummy for the modality neither agree nor disagree). I proceed in the same way for the question I have done better in life than most of my high school mates, creating the dummy variables: Of course, the interactions between opposed attitudes create unequal groups, as people who estimate that they have done well in one dimension, say compared to their parents, most often also judge that they have gone up along other dimensions, say colleagues. The categories of M a n u s c r i p t 11 interest include from 2% of the sample (colleaguesup_schoolmatesdown) to 27% (lowrank_parentsup), i.e. between 200 and 3000 observations (see Table A9 in the Appendix).
The focus of this paper is on the welfare effect of cognitive perceptions, not on the impact of objective income, hence in all regressions, I systematically control for the objective level of household consumption, which is the best indicator of affluence available in the data. I also include the usual socio-demographic controls, namely age, age square, gender, size of the household, children, education dummies, occupation dummies, industry dummies, employment relation dummies (employee/wage earner/ independent farmer/ unemployed) and type of firm dummies (private/public/foreign). Because the way respondents answer subjective questions can be influenced by cultural traits, which differ across nations, I control for country dummies. I cluster by country so as to adjust standard errors for intra-country correlations.
Finally, I also look at the impact of comparisons on the self-declared demand for income redistribution. Redistribution is a measure meant to correct the whole spectrum of income, not just the gap between my income and some other people's income. Hence, one might expect that the demand for redistribution will be more dependent on one's subjective ranking on a general economic ladder than on the more local comparisons to former schoolmates or colleagues.
Using subjective questions
In the prime infancy of the happiness literature, a discussion unavoidably had to be dedicated to the legitimacy of using subjective variables, to the justification of departing from the action-revealed method and to the reliability, the robustness and the meaningfulness of subjective variables, based on cross-ratings, neuro-psychological experiments and other tests of validity. With the accumulation of such arguments through time, readers have become accustomed to the use of subjective data and the literature has gained its lettres de noblesse in the best international economic journals. I leave it to the surveys by Frey and Stutzer (2002), Kahneman and Krueger (2006) or Clark, Frijters and Shields (2008) to persuade the reader about the reliability of subjective questions. M a n u s c r i p t 12
Results
As this is one of the very first surveys asking directly questions about comparisons, it is worth verifying whether these questions are relevant. To be sure, the survey does not ask directly "do you often compare yourself to your former schoolmates" or "how important is it to you to compare with your former colleagues". However, respondents can choose to declare that they "don't know" whether they have done better in life than the indicated group. It is thus interesting to look at the proportion of people (of at least 40 years old) who choose this modality.
It turns out that about 16% of respondents don't know whether they have "done better in life than most of their former high school classmates"; 13% of respondents don't know whether they have outpaced their 1989's colleagues; 4 % choose this modality for the comparison with their parents; 2% for the comparison of their living standard to their 1989 level (and 2% for the life satisfaction question). Concerning the self-ranking questions, only 1% of respondents "don't know" where they stand on a subjective economic ladder, and 2% where they used to stand back in 1989. Given the large changes undergone by the economy and the society during the considered period, these figures are quite impressive. To appreciate them, note that 6% of respondents "don't know" what one's father's profession was. I checked that these orders of magnitudes are quite stable across countries. Further analysis showed that respondents who choose the "don't know" modality are slightly older and poorer, more often women, less educated and more often independent, especially independent farmers. I refer to the working paper version if this paper for the corresponding tables.
Comparisons are important… and asymmetric
The fact that comparison questions are relevant does not necessarily mean that they are important to people. In order to assess the actual impact of comparisons, I now regress life satisfaction over each of the concerned variables. I start with a simple regression of life satisfaction in order to verify that the structure of satisfaction estimates is standard with respect to the usual correlates of individual well-being (see for example Di Tella et al., 2003) .
As expected ( Table A1 in the Appendix), we observe a U shaped relationship between age and satisfaction, and a positive correlation with real household expenditure and education.
Men are slightly happier than women, a frequent observation in Central and Eastern Europe and in Latin America, as opposed to Western Europe and the United States (Graham and M a n u s c r i p t 13 Pettinato, 2002; Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2007; Easterlin, 2009; Grosfeld and Senik, 2008, Caporale et al., 2009) . Life satisfaction increases with the number of adults and children in the household. Being in paid employment (whether in a private or state firm) is a source of higher satisfaction. Table 1 shows (Table A1) to lower values ranging from 0.14 to 0.18. This suggests that up to one third of the satisfaction stemming from consumption could be due not to actual consumption but to the representation of one's living standard as an achievement.
Regressing life satisfaction over one comparison variable runs into the risk of capturing different effects in the same time: both the effect of the subjective comparisons and the effect of individuals' objective current situation. Controlling for the level of household expenditure may attenuate the problem, but is not sufficient, as the effect of income comparisons is likely to differ from one income group to another. One way of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is to consider people whose situation in 1989 was comparable. I use the 1989 ten-step ladder question in order to addresses the following question: conditional on declaring that around 1989 they stood on the 5 th rung in terms of income (which is the case of 21% of the sample), how do comparisons affect people? In Table 1, Table 1 shows that respondents who declare that they used to belong to the upper part of the economic ladder in 1989 report lower levels of life satisfaction (column 1). This can be interpreted in terms of adaptation or higher aspirations. Of course, at this stage, one cannot rule out the reverse causation interpretation, according to which less happy people in 2006 tend to form an ideal image their past economic situation.
A striking result of Table 1 is the asymmetry in the effect of comparisons; namely when comparisons are unfavorable, this has a more important (negative) impact on life satisfaction than when comparisons are favorable. Descending the ranks of the subjective ten-step ladder between 1989 and 2006 (rankdown) has a larger impact than going up (rankup). Judging that my living standard has deteriorated since 1989 (livdown) has a stronger effect (in absolute value) than feeling that it has improved (livup). Assessing that I have made worse in life than my former school mates (schoolmatesdown) has a stronger effect than having succeeded better (schoolmatesup); the same is true as concerns comparison of my life trajectory with that my colleagues (colleaguesup/colleaguesdown) or my parents (parentsup/parentsdown).
This asymmetry can be interpreted as an illustration of the loss-aversion phenomenon suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) . It could also reflect the fact that the downside risk is more important than the upside risk in countries under review. As the questions are qualitative, there is no means to control for this. However, the general macroeconomic trends of the region do not particularly support this assumption. All the countries in the survey have experienced large GDP fluctuations between 1989 and 2006, with an initial stage of output fall, followed by a strong resumption of growth; the context is also different for the various countries of the sample which includes new members of the European Union aside with CIS countries (see for example, EBRD, 2006) . However, the degree of loss aversion may be particularly high in the context of transition, which involves a higher degree of general uncertainty; this would make the results difficult to generalize.
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Which comparisons matter more?
I now turn to the "horse race" between comparison benchmarks, identifying categories of people who have gone up in one dimension but down in another one, i.e. who have undergone different shocks 2 in different dimensions. I estimate life satisfaction on these interacted categories, keeping the same controls as in the previous estimates.
In the following tables, I display only two out of the nine interactions between each pair of variables. The sign of the coefficient is usually significantly positive for the "stable-up" and "up-up" and negative for the "stable-down" and "down-down" interactions 3 .
Local comparisons outweigh general ranking
In a recent paper, Brown, Gardner, Oswald and Qian (2008) have shown that individual satisfaction and well-being is influenced not just by relative income but by the rank-ordered position of one's wage within a comparison set. Their results relate to intra-firm comparisons. Table 2 shows that local comparisons to parents, colleagues and former schoolmates are significantly more important than general social ranking. The sign of the coefficient on the interaction is always determined by the former rather than by the latter. Outperforming one's former colleagues or one's former living standard seems to be a more important element of satisfaction than ranking in the lower or in the upper part of the economic scale.
Does this observation hold as concerns rankings in the general social ladder?
Concerning the subjective evolution of one's position on the social ladder, the observation is identical. Panel B of Table 2 shows that the negative effect of being outperformed by local competitors (schoolmatesdown, colleaguesdown, parentsdown) is more important than the impact of moving up on the social ladder (rankup): the coefficient on the interaction is either M a n u s c r i p t 16 negative or non significant. Conversely, the adverse effect of downward mobility on the social ladder (rankdown) seems to be offset by a favorable comparison with local reference groups; it is never strong enough to attract a significantly negative coefficient.
The predominant influence of internal benchmarks
Another very clear result is that the evolution in one's standard of living, as compared to 15 years ago, has a more important welfare effect than any other comparisons (Panel C of Table   2 ). It dominates the change in one's relative ranking as well as comparisons to local external benchmarks such as one's former colleagues, classmates or parents. The interaction of livup with any other unfavorable comparison always attracts a significantly positive coefficient.
Conversely, a deterioration in one's living standard as compared to 1989 (livdown) always significantly dominates any other favorable local comparison.
The primacy of one's own trajectory could stem from the fact that people have a more accurate idea about the evolution in their own standard of living than about the other evolutions that they are asked to evaluate. As sensible as this seems, this is not consistent with the proportion of "don't know" answers to those questions (see section 4, first paragraph); it also does not explain the asymmetric effect of comparisons.
Amongst local "external" comparators, which are the most important determinants of subjective well-being: schoolmates, colleagues or parents? The estimates (Panel D of Table 2) do not produce clear-cut results. The only significant interactions are between parents on the one hand and former colleagues or schoolmates on the other hand: former colleagues and schoolmates seem to be reference groups of similar importance, outweighing one's parents. Table 2 is that one's own income trajectory matters more than any other comparison benchmark. The feeling of decading is an inconsolable pain, even for respondents who outperformed their former colleagues, schoolmates or parents. M a n u s c r i p t
Comparisons and the demand for redistribution
Income gaps seem to exert a sizeable impact on subjective well-being. Is this associated with a demand for income redistribution? Table 3 shows that the agreement with the statement that "The gap between the rich and the poor today in this country should be reduced" is influenced by income comparisons.
Favorable comparisons are related to a significantly lower demand for redistribution whereas unfavorable ones are associated with a significantly higher demand for income redistribution.
The demand for redistribution thus seems to be consistent with the welfare effects of comparisons.
However, income redistribution is meant to correct the whole social spectrum of income, not just the gap between my income and some other people's income. Hence, one could expect the demand for redistribution to be more dependent on the subjective income ladder than on subjective local comparisons to former schoolmates or colleagues. This prediction is confirmed by Table 3 . Subjective ranking appears to be a significant determinant of the demand for income redistribution, whereas among local comparison benchmarks, only parents and one's own past living standard are.
Concerning interactions, the effects are essentially similar. Panel A of Table 4 illustrates the predominance of subjective ranking (highrank, lowrank) over more local comparisons. Panel Table 4 shows that going down in the economic ladder (rankdown) significantly increases the preference for income redistribution. All other interactions between local benchmarks attract a non significant or positive coefficient. This is the case of interactions that includes comparisons to one's former standard of living (Panel C of Going down in any dimension seems to be a sufficient motive of the demand for redistribution, without any clear hierarchy between local benchmarks. This last observation, again, can be interpreted as a sign of loss aversion.
B of
In summary, income comparisons seem to influence the demand for redistribution based on self-centered motives, as people express a higher demand for redistribution when they declare that they fare worse than their comparison benchmarks. Social ranking is the primary motive of the preference for income redistribution. Local comparisons exert a weak impact on the M a n u s c r i p t 18 demand for redistribution. Compared to the omitted category, people who experience any unfavorable comparison are more in favor of income-equalizing measures.
Robustness of findings
This section examines whether the results are robust to other specifications of the estimates.
As a first robustness test, I have run all the regressions on the entire sample of people aged over 40, without the restriction that respondent A = respondent B (see section 2); the results were qualitatively identical. Second, as the results could be influenced by the fact that 58% of the restricted sample is made of people who were not in paid work at the time of the survey, I ran all the estimations on the sub-sample of respondents who were in paid work in 2006.
Again, the results were qualitatively similar 4 .
Third, for simplicity, I chose to present OLS estimates in the text, where the coefficients are directly interpretable in terms of elasticity. However, this interpretation is based on the assumption that the answers scale is taken as continuous by respondents. In order to give more generality to the results, I ran all the regressions with an ordered probit specification and a logit specification (after collapsing the answers into two modalities 5 ); the results remained qualitatively unchanged. As an illustration, Table A1 in the Appendix presents the results of both an ordered probit and an OLS estimate of Life Satisfaction: the coefficients on all explanatory variables are extremely similar. Table A2 presents an ordered probit estimate of Life Satisfaction including comparison benchmarks: the latter are statistically significant, with similar coefficients as in the OLS specification presented in Table 1 (column 1) .
Fourth, in order to explore the possible heterogeneity in the perception of income gaps, I partitioned the sample into three equal size percentiles in terms of real household consumption, i.e. the third poorest, the third richest and the remaining tier of the sample. Table A3 in the Appendix shows that the coefficients on comparisons benchmarks do not vary much across consumption percentiles. The main differences are that (i) subjective ranking in 1989 has a lower negative impact on welfare for the poorest percentile and (ii) the coefficient on highrank is not significant in the regression on the poorest percentile, although the number of observations is not negligible (510).
Finally, local comparisons could be more or less influent depending on the integration of the considered countries into the world market. Amongst the concerned countries, most countries of Central and Eastern Europe have now entered the European Union; two of them have gone as far as adopting the Euro as their national currency (Montenegro and Slovenia). One could expect that these new members of the European Union are more integrated into the rest of the world, hence less sensitive to local comparisons. However, Table A4 in the Appendix shows that there is no difference in the impact of comparisons whether respondents are citizens of the European Union, the Community of Independent States (CIS) or Former Yugoslavia.
General conclusions
Income comparisons do seem to exert an impact on subjective well-being per se. "Internal benchmarks" created by one's own trajectory are the most powerful. This does not mean that external benchmarks are not important; local comparison to precise groups of people prove to be more influential than self-ranking on an economic ladder. Comparisons to former schoolmates and colleagues are also more important than comparison to one's parents. The analysis also provides pervasive evidence of loss aversion. Unfavorable comparisons are always more powerful, in terms of welfare effect, than positive ones.
The welfare impact of comparisons is associated with a consistent demand for redistribution in the sense that unfavorable comparisons, which reduce life satisfaction, also call for higher income redistribution (and conversely). However, the demand for redistribution is essentially associated with social ranking, rather than with local comparison benchmarks.
The two main results, i.e. the power of comparisons to one's own past level of income and loss aversion, can be interpreted as manifestations of adaptation. Models of habituation with adjustment costs are consistent with the stronger effect of a reduction in consumption as compared to an increase. Indeed, with adaptation, the welfare effect of an increase in one's income partly "evaporates" due to the "preference drift", whereas the welfare effect of a Page 21 of 37 A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 20 decrease in income is magnified: individuals then suffer not only from the reduced consumption due to the fall in their income but also from the adjustment in the level of aspirations.
The higher welfare impact of one's own trajectory and of the reference groups formed by former schoolmates and colleagues can be interpreted as the effect lost or seized opportunities. What is painful is to have done worse than people who were like you at some point. This is much more important than moving along the general economic ladder. People suffer less from going down in the social hierarchy if all their former peers share the same fate. But they hate under-performing their former companions. This may be because reference groups represent some virtual, potential achievement. In summary, the idea would be that comparisons hurt not so much because of relative deprivation but rather because people care about having seized their opportunities.
The fact that local comparisons have a higher impact on subjective well-being, whereas the demand for income redistribution is mostly responsive to social ranking bears policy implications. Aversion to inequality should not be confused with relative utility. People suffer from relative deprivation rather than from general income inequality. They especially dislike experiencing a decline in their living standard. But this does not turn them in favor of income equalization. Hence, offering people the opportunity to improve their own situation and achieve their projects could be more welfare improving than narrowing the income ladder. Controls: number of adults in household, number of children in household, age, gender, employment status of first job (wage-earner/independent/ self-employed), dummies for state/private/foreign ownership of firm of first job, highest educational degree obtained, type of industry of first job, ever been member of Communist party, country dummies.
All standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by country.* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Econrank1989: subjective economic rank around 1989; econrank2006: subjective economic rank in 2006.
Highrank: declared rank in 2006 >5 (out of 10 rungs); lowrank: declared rank in 2006 <5; averank2006: declared rank in 2006=5. Rankup: rank in 2006> rank in 1989 rankdown: rank in 2006< rank in 1989 rankstab: rank in 2006=rank in 1989 A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 25 Schoolmatesup: dummy for the modalities "agree" and "strongly agree" with the statement "I have done better in life than most of my high school mates".
Matedown: dummy for the modalities "disagree" and "strongly disagree" with the statement "I have done better in life than most of my high school mates".
Colleaguesup: dummy for the modalities "agree" and "strongly agree" with the statement "I have done better in life than most of my colleagues I had around 1989"».
Colleaguesdown: dummy for the modalities "disagree" and "strongly disagree" with the statement "I have done better in life than most of my colleagues I had around 1989"».
Parentsup: dummy for the modalities "agree" and "strongly agree" with the statement "I have done better in life than my parents".
Parentsdown: dummy for the modalities "disagree" and "strongly disagree" with the statement "I have done better in life than my parents".
Livup: dummy for the modalities "agree" and "strongly agree" with the statement "My household lives better nowadays than around 1989".
Livdown: dummy for the modalities "disagree" and "strongly disagree" with the statement "My household lives better nowadays than around 1989".
Livstab, matesstab, colleaguestab and parentsstab are dummies for the modality "neither agree nor disagree" with the aforementioned statements.
Omitted categories: averank2006 (rank=5 in 2006) for columns 8 and 9, resp. livstab, rankstab, schoolmatestab, parentstab, colleaguestab for columns 4-5 and 8-15.
Each cell of the table corresponds to a separate regression. It displays the regression coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis (columns 1 and 3), as well as the number of non missing observations and R2 of the regression (columns 2 and 4). 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13 and 15: Sub-sample of respondents who declare that in 1989 they stood on the fifth rung of a subjective 10 steps economic ladder.
Columns
Example: one percent increase on the 2006 social rank brings about 0.218% increase on the subjective life satisfaction scale (first column, second row).
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A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 26 A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 28 All standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by country. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 30 A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 32 A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 33
Descriptive Statistics
Sample restricted to respondents aged over 40, where respondent A=respondent B, and no observation is missing for the subjective comparison questions. Weights (3 rd column) correct for the national composition of the population but do not reconstitute the size of the different countries. A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 34 M a n u s c r i p t 35 Weighted statistics. Weights correct for the national composition of the population but do not reconstitute the size of the different countries.
The mean value of these dummy variables indicates the proportion of respondents who chose the corresponding modality.
